Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Humean World: a world without causality - phenomenally like our world. See also David K. Lewis, Humean supervenience, Humean mosaic._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David K. Lewis on Humean World - Dictionary of Arguments
V IX Humean supervenience/HS/Lewis: Thesis: everything in the world is a large mosaic of local facts - there is a geometry: a system of external relations of spatiotemporal distances between points - at the points we have local qualities, perfectly natural intrinsic properties - everything is an arrangement of qualities (AoQ). Everything supervenes on it. Important argument: there is no distinction without difference. - That does not mean that two possible worlds could not be different without having a difference in the AoQ. Cf. >Causality/Hume. Example 1) possible worlds with Humean supervenience, 2) possible worlds without! - ((s) i.e. Humean supervenience is contingent). Lewis: for our inner sphere of possibilities there is no such distinction. V VII Arrow of time: only in one direction - the Humean supervenience has to consider this asymmetry. - Humean supervenience/(s): does not mean here that causality is denied. --- V X Materialism/Humean supervenience/Lewis: materialism is a metaphysics that is to confirm the truth of known physics. Humean supervenience: it may be that the Humean supervenience is true and all our physics wrong. V 111 Humean supervenience/Coincidence/Lewis: If the Humean supervenience is wrong, there is a fatal counter e.g., which is made by coincidences - then coincidences and coincidence theories do not supervene on facts. Problem: a theory of coincidence is not something that itself may only have a certain chance - (which also says the Principal Principle PP) - an equally likely deviant pattern would lead to an entirely different coincidence theory. Right: chances are contingent because they depend on contingent facts, but not because they depended on a theory of coincidence - then the Humean supervenience is maintained. --- Schwarz I 112 Humean supervenience/Lewis/Schwarz: From description which property exists at point X and which at point y we learn which properties these are, thus in which the laws of nature apply._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Humean World
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28